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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has progressively revised the rule of purely 
internal situations to ensure a wider scope of application of the economic freedoms as well as 
the EU citizenship right to move and reside freely within the Union. This development, 
combined with the increasing importance of fundamental rights, has strengthened the family 
life protection of those EU citizens who come within the scope of EU law. The limit between 
the individuals who may benefit from a EU right to family reunification and fundamental 
rights protection and those who find themselves in purely internal situations has, however, 
become more legally uncertain. The disadvantage suffered by those who fall outside the scope 
of EU law is known as reverse discrimination. 
The 2011 case Zambrano confirmed the trend towards an increasingly generous EU law 
protection of family life in cases where the exercise of freedom of movement and enjoyment 
of EU citizenship rights is potentially restricted by a Member State measure. By contrast, in 
the subsequent McCarthy- case, it became clear that families in purely internal situations may 
only rely on national immigration and procedural law to obtain family reunification and 
protection of their fundamental rights. This problem of reverse discrimination would 
disappear if EU fundamental rights protection covered all Member State nationals regardless 
of whether there was a cross-border dimension to their case. That, however, could only be the 
result of a leap towards a federalized EU structure where fundamental rights would have the 
character of constitutional EU citizenship rights. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ECHR   European Charter of fundamental Human Rights 
EU  European Union 
TCN   third country national – a person not holding the nationality of any 
of the EU Member States 
TEU   the Treaty on European Union 
TFEU   the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
The Charter  the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
Community worker  a person coming within the scope of Article 45 TFEU on freedom 
of movement for workers 
 
The Court  The Court of Justice of the European Union, located in 
Luxembourg 
 
The Strasbourg-Court  The European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, 
France 
The Treaty/ Treaties the primary law Treaty/ Treaties in force at the relevant time 
 
 
 
OTHER DEFINITIONS 
 
Regarding the numeration of Treaty Articles, the current numeration of the provisions in the 
TFEU and TEU is used except for when quoting case law from before the Lisbon Treaty 
amendments came into force in 2010. 
 
In general, the expression EU law is used instead of Community law except for in quotations 
and express references to historical developments where Community law and Community 
worker are the more accurate expressions. 
 
When referring to unspecified persons, such as EU citizens or Community workers, “he” and 
“his” are used as generic pronouns as this is the standard used in the Court’s case law. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1  Family reunification and reverse discrimination in EU law 
The rulings C-34/09 Zambrano and C-434/09 McCarthy, which came out on 8 March 2011 
and 5 May 2011 respectively, essentially concerned the same issue: the boundary between 
those EU citizens who may and those who may not enjoy a right to family reunification under 
EU law. In Zambrano, the family members in question were the third country national, TCN, 
parents of two EU citizen children whereas the McCarthy-case concerned the TCN spouse of 
a EU citizen. The Advocates General Sharpston and Kokott presented quite contrary opinions 
regarding the applicability of EU law to protect the family lives of EU citizens. These 
differences were reflected in the following judgements. In Zambrano the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, the Court, ensured the TCN family member’s possibility to benefit from 
a right of residence under EU law in the EU citizen’s home country. By contrast, the same 
possibility was firmly rejected in McCarthy. The McCarthy spouses were therefore obliged to 
depend solely on the stricter national immigration law and procedures to obtain family 
reunification. The different outcomes of the two cases illustrate the problem of reverse 
discrimination: a EU citizen who does not come within the scope of EU law might be put at a 
disadvantage compared to those EU citizens who may rely on more beneficial rights and 
fundamental rights protection under EU law. The limit to relying on the right to family 
reunification – a sensitive area of great consequence for the concerned individuals – causes a 
distressing kind of difference in treatment between EU citizens.  
 
1.2  Aim, purpose and questions 
This master thesis aims to present and analyse the rule of purely internal situations and the 
issue of reverse discrimination in the EU case law concerning freedom of movement for 
persons, EU citizenship and the right to family reunification. The purpose is to show the 
developments in the Court’s jurisprudence leading up to the two recent rulings in Zambrano 
and McCarthy. The main question is hence: How has the Court’s rule of purely internal 
situations in the area of free movement of persons and the right to family reunification 
developed over the years? Supplementary questions to answer are: Firstly, how has this 
development been influenced by the introduction of EU citizenship as well as by the 
increasing importance of fundamental rights in EU law? Secondly, how does the Court 
address the issue of reverse discrimination in relation to free movement of persons and EU 
citizenship? And finally, to what extent are the cases Zambrano and McCarthy in line with the 
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Court’s previous case law concerning purely internal situations, reverse discrimination and 
the possibility for TCN family members to obtain residence rights by virtue of EU law? 
 
1.3  Methodology and delimitations 
The research method used for the study is traditional legal method. The case law of the 
Court, expressed in both its rulings and the opinions of the Advocates General, are the main 
tools for the analysis. EU primary law and secondary legislation as well as books and articles 
by judicial scholars have been studied and are referenced accordingly. 
These tools are used to present the rule of purely internal situations and the Court’s 
approach to reverse discrimination in connection to free movement of persons, EU citizenship, 
family reunification and the fundamental right to respect for family life. 
The analysis will not focus on the Court’s approach to purely internal situations in other 
areas, such as free movement of goods and capital. Some case law from these areas are, 
however, referenced to illustrate the Court’s aim to abolish restrictions to the exercise of all of 
the economic freedoms. Although the purely internal situations-rule and the occurrence of 
reverse discrimination is of concern for many areas of EU law, this master thesis is limited to 
these issues in connection to freedom of movement for persons and the right to family 
reunification. 
 
1.4 Outline 
Chapter 2 presents the rule of purely internal situations as the Court’s traditional 
instrument to delimit the scope of the freedom of movement provisions. Chapters 3 and 5 
show how the introduction of EU citizenship has resulted in the Court’s revision of the purely 
internal situations-rule to give the rights attached to the status of EU citizenship an 
increasingly generous scope. Chapter 4 explains the phenomenon of reverse discrimination 
and the debate whether reverse discrimination should be seen as a problem to be solved on 
EU level. Chapters 5-6 discuss how the Court’s jurisprudence concerning family reunification 
has developed towards an increasingly generous protection of the family life of those EU 
citizens who come within the scope of freedom of movement. Chapter 7 presents the 
Advocate’s General opinions and the Court’s rulings in Zambrano and McCarthy. Finally, 
chapter 8 provides a conclusion of the developments in the Court’s case law and its current 
jurisprudence regarding the scope of EU law in the area of free movement, EU citizenship and 
family reunification. 
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2 The rule of purely internal situations 
2.1 Limiting the scope of the economic freedoms 
When acting and legislating within their national competences, the EU Member States may 
not enact rules or measures that obstruct the EU goal of an integrated internal market.1 To 
further that goal, EU primary law provides the economic freedoms of movement of goods, 
services, workers and capital. The freedoms are combined with the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of nationality.2 The Court’s interpretations of the scope of the free 
movement provisions are essential since they limit the extent to which the Members States 
must adjust their national laws and policies to comply with their obligations stemming from 
primary law.3 
For a set of factual circumstances to come within the scope of the economic freedoms, the 
Court has traditionally required an element of cross-border movement between at least two 
Member States.4 In addition, the cross-border movement must have an economic purpose.5 
When the facts of a case do not fulfil these conditions, the EU should not interfere in the 
matter – only the national law of the Member State in which the case is confined should be 
applied to resolve the issue. 6 This is the rule of purely internal situations. 
 
2.2 Free movement of economically active persons 
To come within the scope of the economic freedoms, a person must, firstly, be a national 
of a Member State exercising economic activity - as a worker, a self-employed or a service 
provider. Secondly, the economic activity must be pursued in a Member State other than the 
person’s Member State of nationality.7 A Member State national may then rely on the right to 
family reunification provided in secondary legislation, which provides residence rights in the 
                                                
1 Article 4 (3) the Treaty on European Union, TEU obliges the Member States to take all appropriate measures to 
ensure fulfilment of their tasks stemming from the Treaty and secondary legislation and refrain from actions that 
obstruct the attainment of the Union’s objectives. 
2 Articles 28, 30, 34, 35 (goods) Article 45-48 (workers) Articles 49-55 (freedom of establishment) Article 56-61 
(services) and Articles 63-66 (capital) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU. Article 18 
TFEU and Article 21 the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, the Charter provide a general 
prohibition on nationality discrimination. 
3 See Barnard and Odudu, 2009, op.cit. at pages 3-8.  
4 See Guimont, 2000, op.cit. at para 14-15 and 21 and the cases referred to there. 
5 In Walloon Waste, 1992, op.cit. at para 23, 26 and 28 even movement of waste was considered to have an 
economic purpose and came within the scope of Article 34 TFEU. 
6 Article 5 (2) TEU limits the EU institutions to only act and interfere in areas where the Member States have 
conferred their powers to the Union. Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at page 9 describes 
this phenomenon as the home State principle.  
7 Spaventa, 2008, op.cit. at page 15 defines the necessary elements for coming within the scope of economic free 
movement of persons. 
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host Member State.8 He and his family are also ensured protection against discrimination on 
grounds of nationality or residence: the right to equal treatment.9  
 
2.2.1 The jurisprudence of purely internal situations 
The 1979 case of Saunders shaped the jurisprudence of purely internal situations in the 
area of economic free movement of persons. It was also one of the first cases to confront the 
occurrence of so-called reverse discrimination: the disadvantage that the Member State’s own 
nationals may suffer because they do not come within the protective scope of EU law.10 
 
Saunders, 1979 
Regina Saunders was a British national who was convicted of theft by a court in Wales. 
Her penalty was to return to her native region of Northern Ireland and not set foot in England 
or Wales for at least three years. She claimed that the penal measure restricted her freedom of 
movement in a way incompatible with the Treaty’s freedom of movement for workers.11 In his 
opinion, Advocate General Warner addressed the issue of reverse discrimination. Well before 
the introduction of EU citizenship, his view was that the protection against discriminatory 
treatment was applicable to all Member State nationals regardless of the presence of a cross-
border element. If the Court found that the restraining order conflicted with free movement of 
workers then non-British Community workers would be protected from the UK imposing 
such a penal measure on them. Warner held that in that case, it would be against the right to 
equal treatment to allow it to be imposed on a British national.12 
The Court did not agree. It stated that the Treaty’s right to equal treatment only aimed at 
protecting non-national workers from less favourable treatment than national workers in a 
comparable situation. 13  Ms Saunders was a British national whose circumstances were 
confined to British territory and EU law could not apply to contest a restraining order in 
“(…) situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, where there is no factor 
connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community law.”14 
                                                
8 The residence rights for family members of Community workers were first laid down in Articles 10-11 in 
Regulation No. 1612/68, op.cit. They have been replaced by Articles 6-7 and 16 in Directive 2004/38, op.cit. 
which was to be transposed into the Member States’ national legislations by 2006. 
9 The protection against nationality discrimination of workers is expressly stated in Article 45(2) TFEU. See also 
Article 18 TFEU, Article 21 the Charter and the Preamble and Article 7 in Regulation No. 1612/68, op.cit. The 
Court has confirmed that the right to equal treatment applies also to family members of Community workers, see 
Meeusen, 1999, op.cit. at para 22-25. 
10 For definitions of reverse discrimination see inter alia Ritter, 2006, op.cit. at page 691, Foster, 2010, op.cit. at 
page 322 and Poaires-Maduro, 2000 op.cit. at page 127 where he refers to Pickup. See also section 4 below. 
11 Saunders, 1979, op.cit. at para 1-3. 
12 Opinion in Saunders, 1979, op.cit. at 1142-1143.  
13 Saunders, 1979, op.cit. at para 8-10. 
14 Id. at para 11. See also para 12. 
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Implicitly, the Court thereby established that if Ms Saunders suffered reverse 
discrimination because of the inapplicability of EU law, this was a matter to be treated solely 
by national legislation and courts. As seen below in section 3.3 the introduction of EU 
citizenship did not change the Court’s view on this point. 
 
2.2.2 Protecting returning workers from reverse discrimination 
Knoors, 1979 
Mr Knoors was a Belgian national who had resided in the Netherlands where he had 
trained and worked as a plumber before returning to establish himself as a plumber in 
Belgium. By virtue of fulfilling the requirements of cross-border movement and economic 
activity, his case came within the scope of the Treaty’s economic freedoms.15 Despite being a 
Belgian national, he was therefore protected from the stricter Belgian professional 
qualifications for plumbers. 16  Belgium was indeed competent to maintain its national 
standards for its own nationals since the area was not harmonised on Community level. But 
the principle of mutual recognition hindered them from imposing the same requirements on 
Community nationals who had legally qualified as plumbers by the standards in another 
Member State. To require that those plumbers also fulfilled Belgian standards would have 
been indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality.17 The Knoors-jurisprudence thereby 
established that neither foreign Member State nationals nor home Member State nationals, 
who have exercised an economic freedom, are in a purely internal situation. They are both 
protected against national measures that make it more difficult for them to establish 
themselves in the country.18 Hence, reverse discrimination is not discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. In the area of the economic freedoms, it is a consequence of not fulfilling the 
requirements of cross-border pursuit of economic activity.19 
  
                                                
15 The economic freedom at issue was the freedom of establishment, Article 49 TFEU. 
16 Knoors, 1979, op.cit. at para 15-20. 
17 Id. at para 10-11.The principle of mutual recognition was first established in the area of goods in the ruling in 
Cassis, 1979, op.cit. notably at para 8 and 14. In the absence of harmonisation measures, Germany was entitled 
to impose its national standards for alcoholic liquors on its domestic producers but had to accept liquors 
produced lawfully in other Member States being sold on the German market under the designation liquor.  
18 Knoors, 1979, op.cit. at para 24 and 28. 
19 Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 19-21 holds that reverse discrimination is 
discrimination due to the non-contribution to the Union’s aims. 
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2.3 The restrictions-approach – challenging the cross-border element 
2.3.1 Prohibiting restrictive measures to ensure the internal market-goal 
As seen above, the Member States are prohibited to impose rules or measures that have a 
directly or indirectly discriminatory effect on persons that fulfil the requirements of economic 
activity with a cross-border element. To ensure the internal market-goal of the economic 
freedoms, the Court loosened the requirement of physical cross-border movement for the free 
movement provisions to apply. In the Dassonville-ruling, the Court widened the scope of 
application of the Article 34 TFEU on free movement of goods dramatically. It found that the 
Treaty also prohibited measures that were not discriminatory but nevertheless might have a 
restrictive effect on cross-border trade.20 Consequently, even without movement of a certain 
good, the Court could contest a national measure that hindered the hypothetical cross-border 
trade of those goods in general.21 
By adopting such a restrictions-approach, the Court has found that cases where the 
national measure and the affected goods are completely confined to a single Member State 
come within the scope of EU law.22 Progressively, the Court has adopted a restrictions-
approach to both the economic and non-economic free movement of persons as well as the 
enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. 
 
2.3.2 Economic free movement of persons – the deterrence-principle 
The restrictions-approach allowed the Court to contest any national measure that might 
impede the economic free movement of persons, regardless of whether it was applied without 
distinction to foreign or home Member State nationals. In the 1995 Bosman-case, a 
professional football-player could rely on the right of freedom of movement for workers 
against his home Member State Belgium to contest club transfer fees: a measure which 
restricted his possibility to accept job offers in football clubs abroad.23 
In cases Kraus and Gebhard, the Court established that any measure having the effect of 
deterring a person from making use of their right of economic freedom of movement came 
within the scope of the Treaty and had to be objectively justified.24 This deterrence-principle 
has been used by the Court in the area of free movement of persons as an expression of the 
restrictions-approach. As shown below, it has motivated the Court’s generous protection of 
                                                
20 Dassonville, 1974, op.cit. at para 5. 
21 See Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 88-89. Inter alia cases Brown Bees, 1998, 
op.cit. at para 16-20 and GB-INNO, 1990, op.cit. at para 7-9 and 18-19 exemplify how the Court has used the 
restrictions-approach to protect also hypothetical cross-border trade. 
22 Pistre, 1997, op.cit. at para 43-45 and Carbonati Apuani, 2004, op.cit. at para 23-26. 
23 Bosman,1995, op.cit. at para 98-100. 
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the rights to family reunification and equal treatment as well as the fundamental rights of the 
EU citizens who come within the scope of freedom of movement. 
 
 
3 EU citizenship 
3.1 Defying the economic element of the purely internal situations-rule 
The introduction of EU citizenship through the 1993 Maastricht Treaty started a new era 
in the Court’s case law. Previously, Member State nationals had enjoyed protection against 
discriminatory treatment only in their capacity as economically active persons,25  while 
secondary legislation provided residence rights for workers and self-employed persons who 
wished to settle in a host Member State.26 The introduction of EU citizenship, however, 
resulted in a loosening of the requirement of economic activity for a person to enjoy these 
rights under EU law. 
 
3.1.1 Equal treatment and residence as EU citizenship rights 
Article 20 (1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU state that EU 
citizenship is the status of all Member State nationals. Articles 20 (2) and 21 TFEU both 
provide the EU citizenship right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States without the demand of economic activity.27 In developing the meaning and scope of EU 
citizenship, the Court has interpreted the right to equal treatment and the right to move and 
reside freely as directly effective citizenship rights. 
 
Grzelczyk, 2001 
In the landmark EU citizenship case Grzelczyk it was clear that pursuit of economic 
activity was no longer a precondition to come within the scope of the EU prohibition on 
nationality discrimination. Mr Grzelczyk was a Belgian student, residing in the UK. He had 
turned to the British social security system but was denied social allowance by virtue of being 
a non-national student. The Court held that since Mr Grzelczyk had exercised his EU 
citizenship right of freedom of movement his situation came within the scope of EU law. He 
was therefore entitled to rely on the right to equal treatment in Article 18 TFEU. 
                                                                                                                                                   
24 Gebhard, 1995, op.cit. at para 37 and Kraus, 1993, op.cit. at para 16, 23, 28, 32 and 42. 
25 In Cowan, 1989, op.cit. at para 17 the Court held that even passive economic players like service recipients 
may rely on the right to equal treatment when consuming services in another Member State. See supra at 
footnote 9. 
26 See supra at footnote 8. 
27 The right to move and reside freely is also a fundamental right according to Article 45 the Charter. 
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“Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those 
who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their 
nationality.”28 
The general prohibition on nationality discrimination in Article 18 TFEU thereby applies 
also to EU citizens who do not pursue economic activity but make use of their right to free 
movement in Article 21 TFEU.29 If the requirement of a cross-border element is fulfilled, they 
are not in a purely internal situation. In Baumbast and R, the same was held for the right of 
residence. 
 
Baumbast and R, 2002 
Mr Baumbast, a German national, had enjoyed a right of residence in the UK as a 
Community worker. After his economic activity ceased, British authorities contested that he 
and his family were residing lawfully in the UK. The Court established that by being a EU 
citizen, Mr Baumbast enjoyed a directly effective right of residence in the host Member State 
by virtue of Article 21 TFEU. That right might, however, be conditioned by secondary 
legislation stating the requirements of economic self-sufficiency and full health care 
insurance.30 The Court underlined that any limits to the EU citizenship right of residence must 
applied objectively and proportionately by the Member States.31 
 
D’Hoop, 2002 
The case D’Hoop concerned a Belgian national who had completed her upper secondary 
education in France. She had returned to Belgium to pursue university studies but was there 
denied a study grant. Belgian law provided that the grant was only given to students who had 
completed their primary studies in Belgium or foreign nationals who had obtained the 
equivalent qualifications in their home States. Belgian nationals who had studied abroad were 
therefore put at a disadvantage. The Court applied the deterrence-principle to argue that the 
contested measure might deter Belgian nationals from exercising their EU citizenship right to 
free movement. Since Ms D’Hoop had made use of that right she was not in a purely internal 
situation before her home Member State. She could therefore rely on the right to equal 
                                                
28 Grzelczyk, 2001, op. cit. at para 31. 
29 Id. at para 29-30, 32-37. The same was held in Trojani, 2004, op.cit. at para 40. A homeless French national 
who, by virtue of Belgian immigration law, was residing lawfully in Belgium, was entitled to rely on the right to 
equal treatment in Article 18 TFEU as a EU citizenship right. Compare this ruling to Saunders, supra section 
2.2.1. 
30Article 21 TFEU provides that there may be conditions and limitations to the EU citizenship right to move and 
reside freely. Directive 2004/38, op.cit. state how the Member States may legally condition the residence of 
foreign EU citizens in their territories. 
31 Baumbast and R, 2002, op.cit. at para 81, 83-91.  
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treatment in Article 18 TFEU to protect her from being subject to the indirectly 
discriminatory Belgian rule. 32   
 
3.2 The elastic concept of the cross-border element 
EU citizenship has abolished the requirement of economic activity for a person to come 
within the scope of EU law. But the Court has hesitated to also lift the requirement of a cross-
border element.33 The three cases above suggest that exercise of the right to free movement in 
Articles 20 (2) and 21 TFEU is a precondition for coming within the scope of the prohibition 
on nationality discrimination and the right of residence.34 However, in developing the concept 
of EU citizenship, the Court has aimed at ensuring the effective enjoyment of the rights 
attached to that status. Consequently, the Court has narrowed down the concept of purely 
internal situations by accepting quite far-fetched ways to fulfil the cross-border element.35 The 
consequence has been a strengthening of the status of EU citizenship and an extended scope 
of the EU protection against discriminatory treatment. 
 
Schempp, 2005 
Mr Schempp, a German national, was working and residing in Germany. His ex-wife, to 
whom he paid allowance, chose to move to Austria. Mr Schempp was therefore unable to 
deduct the allowance payments from his income tax since his ex-wife’s income could not be 
taxed in the German system. The German Government held that the case was a purely internal 
situation but the Court found that the case in fact contained a cross-border element. Mr 
Schempp’s ex-wife had made use of her EU citizenship right to move and reside freely. This 
movement affected the situation of her ex-husband. Although direct taxation was within the 
exclusive competence of each Member State, the Court reminded Germany that national 
measures must not obstruct the exercise of the EU citizenship right of freedom of movement. 
It therefore concluded that Article 18 TFEU should be applied to assess whether Mr Schempp 
was put at an unjustified disadvantage because of his wife’s move.36 
 
  
                                                
32 D’Hoop, 2002, op.cit. at para 3-5, 8-12, 21, 27-31, 33-36 and 39-40. 
33 Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at page 447. Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at page 757. Note that all the 
cases mentioned in section 3.1 involved migration between two Member States. 
34 For the view that freedom of movement is not merely one of several EU citizenship rights but a precondition 
for relying on the rights attached to EU citizenship, see Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at page 749 and Spaventa, 
2008, op.cit. at pages 27 and 31. 
35 Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at page 444-448. 
36 Schempp, 2005, op.cit. at para 14-19, 22-29. 
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Garcia Avello, 2003 
The facts in the Garcia Avello-case did not involve any inter-state movement. Mr and Mrs 
Garcia Avello were a Spanish-Belgian couple, residing in Belgium. Their two children 
obtained dual Spanish and Belgian nationality at birth. Belgian authorities did not, however, 
accept the use of the Spanish custom to use two surnames. Consequently, the children were 
registered under different surnames in Belgium and Spain. The Court had to decide whether 
the Belgian refusal was compatible with the children’s status as EU citizens and the 
prohibition against nationality discrimination. All the intervening Member States argued that 
the situation was purely internal since the children were Belgian nationals, residing in 
Belgium and subject to an administrative rule for surnames that was equally imposed on all 
Belgians.37 The Court agreed that the handling of surnames was exclusively within the 
competence of the Member States. However, since the children possessed the nationality of 
one Member State but were residing in another, the Court found that the matter was not a 
purely internal situation.38 Consequently, the Garcia Avello children could rely on the general 
prohibition on discrimination in Article 18 TFEU, which requires: 
“(…) that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be 
treated in the same way”39 
The Court found that the Belgian authorities were wrong to impose the same treatment on 
the Garcia Avello children as on other Belgian nationals. By holding dual nationality in two 
Member States, they were not in the same situation as persons of solely Belgian nationality. 
Furthermore, since the children went under different surnames in their two Member States of 
nationality, their future, hypothetical exercise of their EU citizenship right of free movement 
might be seriously inconvenienced.40 
 
Rottmann, 2010 
The future, hypothetical exercise of freedom of movement sufficed as a cross-border 
element also in the Rottmann-case. Dr Rottmann was an Austrian national who had moved to 
Germany and resided there for many years. He subsequently acquired German nationality, 
which under Austrian law resulted in the loss of his Austrian citizenship. When German 
authorities found that Dr Rottmann had acquired German nationality on fraudulent grounds, 
they wanted to withdraw it. The result of that measure would have been to render Dr 
                                                
37 Garcia Avello, 2003, op.cit. at para 14-20. 
38 Id. at para 21-28 and 36-37. 
39 Id. at para 31. See also para 29 and 30, where the Court combined Articles 18 and 20 TFEU to assess the 
legality of the Belgian measure. 
40 Id. at para 32-35 and 42-45. 
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Rottmann stateless.41 Although acquisition of nationality was within the exclusive competence 
of the Member State, the Court found that this was not a purely internal situation. A national 
measure that was 
“(…) placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally possessed, in a 
position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC42 and the rights attaching 
thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law.”43 
 Clearly, the Court rejected the national measure since it restricted Dr Rottmann’s 
possibility to make use of his EU citizenship rights. The internal-market goal of the economic 
freedoms seemed to be of less concern, as the Court upheld the quality of EU citizenship. The 
act of making Dr Rottmann stateless therefore had to be justified and proportionate in order to 
comply with the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship.44 
 
3.3 EU citizenship does not remedy reverse discrimination 
However creative the Court has been in accepting a sufficient cross-border element, there 
are still cases that are found to be purely internal situations. EU citizens then find themselves 
outside the scope of Article 18 TFEU. The early EU citizenship-case Jacquet established that 
mere Member State nationality is not enough to rely on the EU citizenship right to equal 
treatment to contest discriminatory treatment by Member State authorities. 
 
Jacquet, 1997 
Mrs Jacquet was a TCN spouse of a German national. Her husband had always resided and 
worked in Germany. Consequently, when Mrs Jacquet was subject to nationality 
discrimination by the University that employed her, she could not contest that treatment by 
relying on the EU prohibition on discriminatory treatment of family members of a EU citizen. 
The Court stated firmly that: 
“(…) citizenship of the Union (…) is not intended to extend the scope rationae materiae of the Treaty also to 
internal situations, which have no link with Community law (…) Any discrimination which nationals of a 
Member State may suffer under the law of that State falls within the scope of the internal legal system of that 
State.”45 
The statement confirmed that the Saunders-jurisprudence still stands and that EU law 
cannot be relied upon against discriminatory treatment in purely internal situations. The status 
of EU citizenship therefore does not prevent the occurrence of reverse discrimination: the 
                                                
41 Rottmann, 2010, op.cit. at para 22-32. 
42 Now Article 20 TFEU. 
43 Rottmann, 2010, op.cit. at para 42. See also para 38-41. 
44 Id. at para 43-48 and 55-56. 
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disadvantageous treatment that Member State nationals might suffer because they are unable 
to invoke EU law. 
 
 
4 Reverse discrimination 
4.1 A consequence of the purely internal situations-rule 
Reverse discrimination occurs as a consequence of the Court’s unwillingness to interfere 
in purely internal situations.46 A said above, nationals of a certain Member State might suffer 
a disadvantage because they are subject to national regulations and measures that EU law 
prohibits the Member State to apply to nationals or products originating from other Member 
States.47 Poaires-Maduro has pointed out that it is unusual that a State wishes to discriminate 
its own nationals. It is rather that EU law might oblige a Member State to treat foreign EU 
nationals in a different, sometimes more privileged, way than the national policies and 
legislation intend to treat its own nationals.48 
As seen in Knoors and D’Hoop, reverse discrimination is not discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. It is rather a discrimination based on not coming within the scope of EU law.49 In 
the area of free movement of persons, such differential treatment has traditionally been due to 
the absence of the cross-border element and the economic purpose. However, the 
jurisprudence of purely internal situations has, as seen above, been revised. The Court’s 
restriction-based approach to free movement of persons combined with its loosening of the 
economic purpose requirement and generous interpretation of the cross-border element have 
extended the scope of EU law. EU citizens who are working or residing in a Member State 
other than their nationality are obviously fulfilling the cross-border requirement. Hence, only 
non-migrant Member State nationals with no connection to the Treaty’s economic freedoms 
or EU citizenship provisions might be subjected to reverse discrimination.50 
In practice, reverse discrimination becomes apparent when differential treatment is based 
on internal, regional borders. As described by Nic Shuibhne, Scottish Universities may 
demand higher university fees from students from England or Wales but EU citizens from any 
                                                                                                                                                   
45 Jacquet, 1997, op.cit. at para 23. 
46 Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at page 9 and Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009 op.cit. at 
page 434.  
47 Ritter, 2006, op.cit. at pages 690-691and supra at footnote 10. 
48 Poaires-Maduro, 2000, op.cit. at page 127.  
49 See supra at footnote 19. 
50 Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at page 434. 
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of the other Member States are entitled to the same treatment as the Scottish students.51 The 
Flemish Welfare Aid-case from 2008 concerned a provision that required persons working in 
the Belgian-Flemish region to reside there in order to be covered by the Flemish health care 
scheme. This put Belgian nationals who were residing in the Walloon region while working in 
the Flemish region at a disadvantage compared to foreign EU citizens and Belgian nationals 
who had exercised their right of freedom of movement. Only the two latter groups were 
protected from the indirectly discriminatory residence requirement by virtue of the EU 
prohibition on discriminatory treatment.52 
In the area of family reunification, reverse discrimination becomes apparent when a TCN 
spouse of a EU citizen is permitted to reside and engage in economic activity in all EU 
Member States except for the spouse’s own.53 As seen below in section 7.2, this particular 
type of reverse discrimination was challenged in the McCarthy-case. 
 
4.2 The Court’s approach to reverse discrimination 
The Court, by maintaining that EU law is inapplicable to cases that fall outside the scope 
of EU law, has manifested that the effects of reverse discrimination is a matter to be solved 
within the national jurisdictions of the Member States.54 Accordingly, some Member States’ 
own legislation contain equality laws that may be used to avoid reverse discrimination of its 
own nationals. The Court has proved willing to assist the Member States with interpretations 
of EU law also in purely internal situations in order to remedy the effects of reverse 
discrimination. 
 
Dzodzi, 1990 
Mrs Dzodzi was a Togolese national who entered Belgium to marry a Belgian national. 
The husband died after just a few months and Mrs Dzodzi had not yet obtained a permit to 
remain and reside in Belgium. She appealed against the authorities’ decision to expel her. The 
national court asked the Court to interpret the conditions for the right of residence of family 
members to deceased Community workers. Even if Mrs Dzodzi’s situation was purely 
                                                
51 Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at page 732 and 763 gives examples of reverse discrimination. 
52 Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit. notably at para 33-34, 37-48 where the Court clarified that Articles 45 and 
49 TFEU prohibited indirectly discriminatory treatment of workers and self-employed who fulfilled the cross-
border element. In her Opinion in Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit. at para 116 Advocate General Sharpston 
pointed out the paradox of accepting differential treatment based on regional borders but not national. 
53 Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at page 732. In Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 76 the intervening Member States 
pointed out that the Court’s generous interpretation of the right to family reunification of migrant EU citizens in 
Directive 2004/38, op.cit. aggravated the problem of reverse discrimination of non-migrant home State nationals. 
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internal, the national court still needed an interpretation of said conditions in order to apply a 
Belgian law that prohibited reverse discrimination of national workers. Consequently, the 
residence rights granted to TCN spouses of foreign Community workers present on Belgian 
territory should be extended to also TCN spouses of Belgian nationals who were outside the 
scope of the economic freedoms. By lack of a cross-border element, the Court found the case 
to be a purely internal situation. It argued that it nevertheless came within its jurisdiction to 
provide an interpretation of Community law to the Belgian court so it could apply national 
law to remedy reverse discrimination.55 
The Dzodzi-principle was extended in the case Guimont, which concerned free movement 
of goods. The Court found the case to be a purely internal situation but the national court had 
not stated that domestic law prohibited reverse discrimination. Nevertheless, the Court chose 
to interpret Community law since, hypothetically, national law might be used to remedy 
reverse discrimination.56  
 
4.3 A problem or a necessary consequence of purely internal situations? 
Reverse discrimination occurs only in purely internal situations, which are, by definition, 
beyond the scope of EU law. It can therefore be argued that only national courts and 
legislators are rightfully competent to decide whether and how to remedy reverse 
discrimination. Reverse discrimination is thus perceived as a necessary consequence of the 
purely internal situations-rule, which draws the line between the powers of the EU and that of 
its sovereign Member States.57 
Others argue, that, since it is the Court’s interpretation of EU law and its own purely 
internal situation-rule that causes reverse discrimination, the responsibility to solve any 
adverse effects should lie on the EU.58 Because of the Court’s restrictions-approach to free 
movement of persons and the loosened cross-border requirement in the area of EU citizenship 
rights, the situations found to be purely internal might become fewer but the reverse 
                                                                                                                                                   
54 See comment on Saunders supra section 2.1.1, Jacquet, 1997, op.cit. at para 23 and supra section 3.3, Metock, 
2008, op.cit. at para 77-79 and Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit. at para 39-40. 
55 Dzodzi, 1990, op. cit. at para 3-7, 13-16, 22-24, 27-28, 35 and 41-42. See Steen II, 1994, op.cit. at para 8-11 
where the Court held that national anti-discrimination law may be used to remedy reverse discrimination. 
56 Guimont, 2000, op.cit. at para 18-24. See comments to the case in Broberg and Holst-Christensen, 2010, op.cit. 
at pages 261-263. The same approach was applied in Reisch, 2002, op.cit. at para 24-27. Ritter, 2006, op.cit. at 
pages 696-703 strongly criticises that the Court interprets EU law in purely internal situations regardless of 
whether the national courts has stated that they wish to use domestic anti-discrimination law in the case. 
57 Ritter, 2006, op.cit. at pages 706-707 and 709-710, Davies, 2003, op.cit. at page 144. Poaires-Maduro, 2000, 
op.cit. at page 137 points out that for the sake of diversity and competition, the Member States should be able to 
choose their own approaches to reverse discrimination. See also supra at footnote 6. 
58 Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at pages 436-439, and Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at pages 766-769. 
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discrimination that they result in seems arbitrarily motivated and becomes less and less 
justifiable.59 
In her opinion in Flemish Welfare Aid, Advocate General Sharpston argued that Article 21 
TFEU should be read as containing two free-standing EU citizenship rights: a right of 
freedom of movement and a right of residence, both reliable also against the Member State of 
nationality.60 The latter suggestion is not entirely new. As early as in the 1982 Morson and 
Jhanjan-case, the Commission submitted that the only solution to the problem of reverse 
discrimination would be a generalized right of residence for all Member State citizens alike.61 
The effect would be that also EU citizens who had no cross-border element in their case 
would come within the scope of EU law. 
There is, however, reason for the Court to hesitate in taking a step towards completely 
abolishing the purely internal situations-rule. Unlimited applicability of the rights attached to 
EU citizenship would give the Court jurisdiction to scrutinize literally any rules that the 
Member States impose on their own nationals. This might force a dramatic deregulation 
process in the Member States and open a floodgate of litigation since all State measures could 
be challenged.62 Such a development would also be a huge step towards a federalized EU 
where EU citizenship entails rights of a constitutional character.63 In her opinion in Flemish 
Welfare Aid, Sharpston acknowledges that considerable political and legislative processes are 
required for such an evolution. It should not be the result of a single Court-ruling.64 
It can nevertheless be argued that reverse discrimination is an incongruity with the concept 
of EU citizenship, the increasing importance of fundamental rights and the principle of 
equality as well as with the aim of establishing a market without internal frontiers. If the 
                                                
59 Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 161-162. Spaventa, 2002, op.cit. at page 31. 
Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at pages 444-446 and at page 435 referring to the Opinion in 
Konstantinidis, 1992, op.cit. 
60 Opinion in Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit. at para 143-144. Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at pages 
447-449 and referring to Sharpston’s Opinion in Flemish Welfare Aid, argue that mere Member State nationality 
and thereby status of EU citizenship should be sufficient to bring a situation within the scope of EU law 
regardless of cross-border movement. As a result, the scope of Article 18 TFEU would be applicable to combat 
the effects of reverse discrimination. 
61 Morson and Jhanjan, 1982, op.cit. at page 3731. The case is presented in the next chapter. 
62 See arguments presented by Ritter, 2006, op.cit. at pages 701-702, Davies, 2003, op.cit. at page 143. 
Dautricourt and Thomas, 2009, op.cit. at pages 49-450. Although critical to the phenomenon of reverse 
discrimination, Nic Shuibhne, 2002, op.cit. at page 732 underlines that she does not intend to advocate for an 
omnipotent EU. 
63 Advocate General Jacobs proposed such a development in his Opinion in Konstantinidis, 1993, op.cit. at para 
46. De Búrca, 2011, op.cit. at pages 484-485 and Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at pages 
650-651 hold that the Lisbon Treaty amendments, which grant the Charter the status of primary law, do not have 
the effect of establishing a set of EU citizenship constitutional rights. 
64 Opinion in Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit at para 156. She also points this out in her Opinion in Zambrano, 
2010, op.cit. at para 171-177. See below in section 7.2.1. 
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status of EU citizenship is to have true substance, it seems unjustified that differentiation 
between EU citizens is made on the basis of the Court’s blurred and legally uncertain 
definition of the cross-border element. 65 As shall be seen in the section below, to leave some 
EU citizens outside the scope of EU law has the most devastating consequences in the area of 
family reunification. 
 
 
5 The right to family reunification in EU law 
5.1 A means to facilitate economic free movement of persons 
As early as in the late 1960’s in Regulation No. 1612/68, EU law recognized the 
importance of ensuring the right of Community workers to be joined by their family members 
when pursuing economic activity in a host Member State. Regardless of nationality, spouses, 
children and dependant relatives in the ascending line, were entitled to derive a right of 
residence from the status of their Community worker family member.66 The reason for 
granting these rights was to facilitate the economic free movement of Member State nationals, 
which served the internal market-goal. The right to family reunification with TCN family 
members was thus not an objective per se. It was rather an effect of the secondary legislation 
that aimed to ensure full effect of the economic freedoms. 67 
The case Morson and Jhanjan illustrated the effect of reverse discrimination in the area of 
family reunification. The Court here affirmed that Member State nationals could not enjoy a 
EU right to family reunification unless it was necessary for facilitating economic cross-border 
migration. True to the Saunders-jurisprudence, the Court denied the applicability of the rights 
to equal treatment and family reunification in Regulation No. 1612/68 to purely internal 
situations. 
 
Morson and Jhanjan, 1982 
The case concerned the Surinamese nationals, Mrs Morson and Mrs Jhanjan; the mothers 
of two naturalised Dutch nationals. Their children had resided and worked only in the 
Netherlands but the mothers claimed a right of residence as dependent family members in the 
                                                
65 See arguments put forward by Tryfonidou, ”Reverse discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 162-171, 
O’Leary, 1996, op.cit. at pages 275-278, Advocate General Poaires-Maduro in his Opinion in Carbonati Apuani, 
2004, op.cit. at para 67-69, Poaires-Maduro, 2000, op.cit. at page 126 and Advocate General Sharpston’s 
Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 127-138. 
66 See supra section 2.2 and footnote 8. See also Costello, 2009 op.cit. at page 588. 
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ascending line of Community workers. They based their argument on Regulation No. 1612/68 
combined with the prohibition on nationality discrimination in Article 18 TFEU. The Dutch 
Government, in its place, argued that in the absence of harmonisation measures on 
Community level, immigration policies and legislation were strictly within the competence of 
each Member State.68 The Commission shared this view and held that the prohibition on 
nationality discrimination could not be relied upon in purely internal situations and was 
therefore not a remedy for reverse discrimination.69 The Court agreed and based its ruling on 
the wording and purpose of the provisions governing free movement of workers and equal 
treatment. It held that both provisions were means to attain the internal market goal. The 
family reunification rights in secondary legislation and the protection against discrimination 
were therefore only applicable to those workers who made use of their right of economic 
freedom of movement in a host Member State.70 The Morson and Jhanjan-ruling thereby 
showed that family reunification with TCN family members does not have to be ensured in 
purely internal situations, which are, per definition, not connected with the internal market-
goal that the economic freedoms serve.71 
 
5.2 Towards a rights-aimed jurisprudence? 
As said above, the Court developed a deterrence-principle in the area of free movement of 
persons as an expression of its restrictions-approach. As a result, the Member States may not 
impose measures on their own nationals that might have a deterrent effect on their exercise of 
the economic freedoms or the EU citizenship right to free movement. In cases Singh and Eind, 
the Court found that a Member State’s refusal to grant residence rights to TCN family 
members was a measure that might have such a deterrent effect. The Court referred to the 
deterrence-principle to ensure the right to family reunification of Community workers who 
return to their home Member States. 
 
Singh, 1992 
Mrs Singh was a British national married to a man of Indian nationality. The couple had 
moved to and resided in Germany for three years where Mrs Singh had been a Community 
worker. Mr Singh had there derived a right of residence from the status of his wife by virtue 
                                                                                                                                                   
67 For this interpretation of the aims of the secondary legislation in question, see Dzodzi, 1990, op.cit. at para 22-
24, the Advocate General’s Opinion in Jia, 2006, op.cit. at para 69 and 72 and Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 
38. See also Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …” 2009, op.cit. at page 646. 
68 Morson and Jhanjan, 1982, op.cit. at pages 3729-3730. 
69 Id. at page 3731. 
70 Id. at para 13-18. 
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of Regulation No. 1612/68. The couple returned to the UK where Mrs Singh took up 
economic activity as a self-employed person. Mr Singh was however denied a residence 
permit under British immigration law. He appealed against the decision by claiming a right of 
residence on the same grounds as he had in Germany; he was the spouse of a migrant, 
economically active Member State national. UK authorities held that, since Mrs Singh was a 
British national the matter was outside the scope of the Treaty’s economic freedoms and the 
residence rights derived from secondary legislation were therefore inapplicable. Only British 
immigration law could apply to purely internal situations.72 
The Court, however, held that the Member States were prohibited to take measures, which 
deterred their own nationals from making use of their right to free movement. A person might 
be deterred if his home Member State presents obstacles to the entry and residence of his 
family members. Mr Singh therefore had to be granted at least the same rights in the UK as he 
did when accompanying his wife in a host Member State.73  
Mrs Singh was an economically active person who had crossed the border from one 
Member State to another to work and then re-entered the first (her home) Member State to 
pursue economic activity there. It was therefore not clear whether the ruling should be 
interpreted as protecting the first or the second act of cross-border movement. If it was the 
second movement, then the Court simply used the Morson and Jhanjan-jurisprudence. The 
right to family reunification is ensured to facilitate economic migration between Member 
States, regardless of where the Community worker is a national. If, on the other hand, the 
Court aimed at protecting the first movement, from the UK to Germany, the deterrence-
principle is badly motivated. It was this first movement that resulted in Mr Singh’s benefit 
from EU residence rights in the first place. If the Singh-couple had remained in the UK, 
national immigration laws would have unarguably applied to Mr Singh.74 There is then no 
apparent connection between facilitating the internal market-goal and granting Mrs Singh the 
right to family reunification. The Singh-ruling can thus be read as the Court’s first step 
towards developing a rights-aimed jurisprudence detached from the Union’s economic 
goals.75 It thus becomes an aim in itself for the Court to ensure the enjoyment of rights of the 
Member State nationals who come within the scope of freedom of movement. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
71 See for example Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at page 637. 
72 Singh, 1992, op.cit. at para 13-14. 
73 Id. at para 15-16 and 19-23. 
74 Costello, 2009, op.cit. at page 618, Poaires-Maduro, 2000, op.cit. at pages 124-125 and Tryfonidou, ”Reverse 
Discrimination …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 98-101. 
75 Inter alia Costello, 2009, op.cit. at page 588, Spaventa, 2008, op.cit. at page 39 talk of the Court’s tendency to 
adopt a rights-aimed jurisprudence. 
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introduction of EU citizenship and the increasing importance of fundamental rights in EU law 
have strengthened this development. In the subsequent case Eind it was clear that the Court 
ensured the right to family reunification of a former Community worker even though the 
granting of that right did not have any bearing on his original pursuit of economic activity in a 
host Member State. 
 
Eind, 2007  
Mr Eind was a Dutch national whose TCN daughter, Rachel, had come from her home 
State of Surinam to join her father in the UK, where he was working. She had there enjoyed a 
right of residence as the family member of a Community worker. Mr Eind later returned to 
the Netherlands where he, because of ill health, didn’t pursue any work but lived off of social 
benefits. The Dutch authorities denied Rachel a right of residence under national immigration 
law. The Member State held that the secondary legislation governing the rights of Community 
workers and their family members didn’t apply since, by contrast to the Singh-case, Mr Eind 
had not returned to his home State to pursue an economic activity. The matter was therefore a 
purely internal situation.76 The Court disagreed and held that to ensure the internal market-
goal, the secondary legislation adopted to give the economic freedoms effect had to be 
interpreted generously.77 In addition, the Court referred to the right of all EU citizens, to move 
and reside freely within the Union, which strengthened Mr Eind’s right to return to his own 
State without being economically active.78 
“Barriers to family reunification are therefore liable to undermine the right to free movement which the 
nationals of the Member States have under Community law, as the right of a Community national to return to 
the Member State of which he is a national cannot be considered to be a purely internal matter.”79 
Being a Dutch national, Mr Eind’s residence in the Netherlands was per definition lawful, 
unconditional and not dependent on economic activity or self-sufficiency. Consequently, a 
Community worker’s right to family reunification in the Member State of origin could not be 
conditional on whether he pursued any economic activity there. Since Mr Eind had made use 
of his right of freedom of movement as a worker when he moved to the UK, Rachel, by 
analogy of the rights of family members in Regulation No. 1612/68, was entitled to a right of 
residence in her father’s home State.80 
                                                
76 Eind, 2007, op.cit. at para 9-13. 
77 Id. at para 43. 
78 Id. at para 32. 
79 Id. at para 37. See also para 35-36 and 44. 
80 Id. at para 31-32, 38-40. 
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 As in Singh, the use of the deterrence-principle seems awkwardly motivated. Since Mr 
Eind had never resided with Rachel in the Netherlands before, protecting his family life in his 
home country seems unconnected to facilitating his exercise of economic free movement.81 
Singh and Eind are better understood if seen as part of the Court’s development of a rights-
aimed jurisprudence parallel to the internal market-goal. To borrow Tryfonidou’s vocabulary, 
it’s as if the Court seeks to protect any individual who have contributed to the economic aims 
of the Union since it does not only grant rights to ensure the effectiveness of the economic 
freedoms.82 To merely have exercised an economic freedom is thus sufficient to have a 
protected right to family life under EU law. 
 
5.3 The advantage of coming within the scope of EU law 
A EU citizen who wishes to be reunited with a TCN family member has a clear advantage 
if his situation comes within the scope of the free movement provisions and the subsequent 
secondary legislation. If the family can only rely on the national immigration laws of the EU 
citizen’s home Member State, they might face considerable difficulties in terms of long 
procedural delays, complicated formal requirements and strict individual assessments.83 By 
contrast, if the TCN is the spouse, child or dependant parent of a EU citizen who fulfils the 
conditions laid down in Directive 2004/38, a residence permit should be obtained by merely 
providing a valid passport and documentation attesting the family relationship.84 
The cases Singh and Eind showed that Community workers continue to enjoy the right to 
family reunification in secondary legislation also if they return to their Member State of 
nationality. But the Court’s rights-aimed jurisprudence has resulted in a generous protection 
of family life also in cases were the secondary legislation was not applicable. The next 
chapter present the cases, which exemplify this approach. In Carpenter the Court ensured the 
right to family reunification of a service provider by referring to the fundamental right to 
respect for family life in Article 8 European Charter of fundamental Human Rights, ECHR. In 
Baumbast and R and Zhu and Chen TCN parents were entitled to indirectly derive a right of 
residence from EU law by virtue of being the primary carers of children who were enjoying 
rights under EU law. 
                                                
81 The intervening Member States disputed that the refusal to grant Rachel a residence permit in the Netherlands 
could have a deterrent effect on Mr Eind’s exercise of freedom of movement to the UK. Id. at para 33. See also 
Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at pages 644-646. 
82 Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at pages 646-647. 
83 Costello, 2009, op.cit. at 588-591. In the Opinion in Jia, 2006, op.cit. at para 33 Advocate General Geelhoed 
pointed out that the Member States were entitled to only admit a TCN person into their territory after an 
individual assessment. 
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6 Extending the protection of family life 
6.1 Fundamental rights in EU law 
For a long time, the Court has referred to fundamental rights, as enshrined in the 
ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member States, as general principles for 
interpreting EU law.85 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the status of EU 
citizenship, contained the recognition of fundamental rights as an integral part of EU law. In 
2000, the EU presented its own Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The 
2009 Lisbon Treaty granted the Charter the same primary law status as the EU Treaties 
alongside the pledge that EU is to become a contracting party to the ECHR.86 However, the 
application of the Charter is limited to the actions of the EU institutions and to the Member 
States only when the latter are implementing EU law.87 Also, Article 6 the Treaty on 
European Union, TEU states that neither the Charter nor the EU’s accession to the ECHR 
shall have the consequence of extending the EU’s competences. 
 
6.1.1 Article 8 ECHR in the Court’s case law 
As fundamental rights have gained importance in EU law the Court has increasingly relied 
on the right to respect for family life in Article 8 ECHR in cases concerning family 
reunification.88 Although all the Member States are contracting parties to the ECHR, family 
reunification is not a fundamental right in itself. According to the Strasbourg-Court, Article 8 
ECHR does not guarantee the enjoyment of family life in any particular country. If family 
reunification can be obtained in another European State or the home State of the TCN family 
member, then denying a right of residence to one or more family members does not infringe 
Article 8 ECHR. The consequence might well be that a EU citizen is obliged to move to 
another State or outside he EU in order to live with his TCN family member. The Strasbourg-
jurisprudence thus provides the contracting States a wide margin of discretion in their 
                                                                                                                                                   
84 Article 10 (2), Directive 2004/38, op.cit. 
85  Article 6 (3) TEU. See inter alia De Búrca, 2011, op.cit. at pages 477-480. See inter alia cases, 
Internationales Handelsgesellschaft, 1970, op.cit. SPUC v Grogan, 1991, op.cit. Familiapress, 1997, op.cit. 
Schmidberger, 2000, op.cit. MRAX, 2002, op.cit. Viking Line, 2007, op.cit. 
86 Article 6 TEU. 
87 Article 51 the Charter. See also De Búrca, 2011, op.cit. at 484-485 who discussed the meaning of the limited 
scope of the Charter. Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at page 651 points out that the 
Charter seems to have a narrower field of application than fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. 
See also supra footnote 63. 
88 In Baumbast and R, 2002, op.cit. at para 72 the Court invoked Article 8 ECHR to interpret the provisions of 
Regulation No. 1612/68, op.cit. In Akrich, 2003, op.cit. at para 58-60 the Court urged the Member States to 
consider the rights in Article 8 ECHR before expelling the concerned TCN family member. See inter alia Foster, 
2010, op.cit. at 337 and Costello, 2009, op.cit. at page 593. See also the Carpenter-case below.  
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immigration control. 89 The Court, on the other hand, strives for a generous a well as uniform 
interpretation of primary law and the secondary legislation that is to give it effect.90 In 
addition, whereas national procedural law might obstruct litigation based on the ECHR, 
fundamental rights are used directly as general principles for interpreting EU law whenever a 
situation comes within its scope.91 In the Carpenter-case, the Court combined a heavy reliance 
on Article 8 ECHR with accepting a tenuous cross-border element to ensure the right to 
family reunification. 
 
Carpenter, 2002  
Mrs Carpenter was a Philippine national, residing in the UK with her British national 
husband and stepchildren. Her residence permit, granted under British immigration law, had 
expired but she continued to remain in the country, appealing against the expulsion order 
against her. She claimed a right of residence by virtue of Community law since her EU citizen 
husband was exercising the right of freedom of movement for services. Mr Carpenter ran a 
business selling advertising space in periodical journals. By use of online communications 
and occasional travels abroad, he provided his services mainly to advertisers established in 
other Member States. For these travels, he was dependent on his wife’s presence in the UK to 
care for his children. Furthermore, if Mrs Carpenter were deported to the Philippines, her 
husband would have to follow her in order to continue their family life together. This would 
in itself be a hindrance to his exercise of the economic freedom of movement for services.92  
By generously interpreting the cross-border element in the case, the Court accepted that Mr 
Carpenter’s occupational activity came within the scope of the free movement of services.93 
However, the secondary legislation governing the right of residence of family members could 
only be applied if the EU citizen and spouse effectively moved to a host Member State.94 The 
Court therefore had to find another legal basis for granting Mrs Carpenter a right of residence. 
By applying the restrictions-approach it found that the national measure to expel Mrs 
                                                
89 The Family Reunification-case, 2006, op.cit. at para 46, 52-56. See also Costello, 2009, op.cit. at pages 612 
and 590-591 where she cites the Strasbourg-Court’s ruling ‘Abdulaziz‘ from 1985.  
90 Id. and see inter alia cases Zhu and Chen, 2004, op.cit. at para 31, Eind, 2007, op.cit. at para 43,  Metock, 
2008, op.cit. at para 68 and 84. 
91 Article 6 (3) TEU. The fundamental right to respect for family life is also expressed in Articles 7 and 33 the 
Charter, and is to be respected by the EU institutions and the Member States when implementing EU law. See 
supra section 6.1. 
92 Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 13-17 and 21. 
93 Id. at para 28-30. The Court referred to its previous ruling in Alpine Investments, 1995, op.cit. where providing 
services over the telephone cross-border had been enough to come within the scope of the Treaty’s free 
movement of services. 
94 Id. at para 32-36. For the current secondary legislation in force, see Article 3 in Directive 2004/38, op.cit. 
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Carpenter would constitute an obstacle to Mr Carpenter’s exercise of the freedom to provide 
services.95 
In addition, the Court seemed to be driven by a rights-aimed approach. Since Mr Carpenter 
was a EU citizen, pursuing one of the economic freedoms, his fundamental rights should be 
ensured under EU law.96 
“The decision to deport Mrs Carpenter constitutes an interference with the exercise by Mr Carpenter of his 
right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights (…), which is among the fundamental rights which, according to the Court’s settled case-law (…) are 
protected in Community law.”97 
The case clearly shows the advantage of coming within the scope of EU law to obtain 
family reunification. Under the Strasbourg-regime, Article 8 ECHR would not have been 
infringed if the Carpenter family could have obtained family reunification in another 
country.98 In the Court’s view, however, such a result would have restricted Mr Carpenter’s 
exercise of his right of freedom of movement for services as well as interfered with his 
enjoyment of the fundamental right to respect for family life. 
 
6.2 TCN parents indirectly deriving residence rights from EU law 
6.2.1 Indirect residence rights derived from secondary legislation 
Baumbast and R, 2002 
In Baumbast and R, the Court ensured a continued right of residence in the UK for a TCN 
parent who was the primary carer of the children she had with a Community worker. While 
residing in the UK, the couple had divorced but the ex-husband, a French national, remained 
in the country as a Community worker. His two minor children therefore derived their rights 
of residence as well as the right to access to primary education by virtue of Regulation No. 
1612/68. However, since the children resided with their TCN mother, they were dependent on 
her care and support to exercise those rights. The Court argued that the mother therefore had 
to be granted residence rights in the UK so her children could enjoy the rights that they in turn 
derived from the status of their father.99 The TCN mother thus indirectly derived a right of 
                                                
95 Id. at para 39. 
96 Hofstotter, 2005, op.cit. at pages 551-552 holds that it was evident that the Court was here rather concerned 
with protecting the fundamental rights of Mr Carpenter since the link between his wife’s residence in the UK and 
his cross-border economic activity was rather far-fetched. 
97 Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 41. 
98 Id. at para 42. See also supra sections 5.3 and 6.1.1. 
99 Baumbast and R, 2002, op.cit. at para 58, 60-63 and 71-75.  
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residence from said Regulation. She was two-times removed from the Community worker 
that made the provisions applicable in the first place.100 
 
6.2.2 Indirect residence rights derived from primary law 
Zhu and Chen, 2004 
The Court ensured residence rights to a TCN primary carer also in Zhu and Chen. This 
case, however, concerned the possibility to indirectly derive a right of residence from the EU 
citizenship right to move and reside freely in Article 21 TFEU. 
Mrs Zhu101, a Chinese national, had entered the UK when she was six months pregnant. 
She continued to Northern Ireland – officially a part of the UK – where she gave birth to her 
daughter Catherine. By virtue of the Irish ius soli rule, Catherine acquired Irish nationality 
and consequently became a EU citizen. After the birth, Mrs Zhu and Catherine moved to 
Wales and thus remained within the UK. None of them was, however, granted a residence 
permit under British immigration law. Mrs Zhu appealed, basing both their claims on 
Catherine’s status as a EU citizen. The Court referred to its ruling in Garcia Avello and found 
that Catherine, by holding the nationality of one Member State while residing since birth in 
another, satisfied the cross- border element and came within the scope of Article 21 TFEU 
and the secondary legislation conditioning that provision.102  
Although she was an infant, the Court held that Catherine was capable of exercising her 
directly effective EU citizenship right to move and reside freely within the Union. The 
conditions to that right were fulfilled since Catherine’s mother provided the sufficient 
economic resources for her. Catherine was therefore legally exercising her right under Article 
21 TFEU and should be granted a residence permit in the UK.103 Mrs Zhu, however, could not 
derive a right of residence by virtue of the family rights in secondary legislation. Such rights 
are only granted to relatives in the ascending line who are dependent on the migrating EU 
citizen.104 In this case, the situation was the opposite. It was the EU citizen, Catherine, who 
was completely dependent on her TCN parent. Mrs Zhu was both the provider of sufficient 
resources and the primary carer who was the necessary support to enable Catherine’s 
                                                
100 See comments to the case by Broberg and Holst-Christensen 2010, op.cit. at pages 563-564 and Foster, 2010, 
op.cit. at page 337. 
101 As noted by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at footnote 22, there has 
been some confusion of surnames in the Zhu and Chen-case. The correct names of the applicants are Catherine 
Zhu and Mrs Zhu. 
102 Zhu and Chen, 2004, op.cit. at para 8-12 and 24-26. See also the comments made by Tryfonidou, ”Family 
Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at page 649. 
103 Zhu and Chen, 2004, op.cit. at para 20, 26-30 and 41. See supra at section 3.1.1 on Baumbast and R. 
104 Id. at para 42-43. Article 2 (2) in Directive 2004/38, op.cit. defines which family members who may benefit 
from the Directive’s residence rights. See also supra section 5.1 on the ruling in Morson and Jhanjan, 1982. 
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enjoyment of her rights under Community law. Mrs Zhu therefore indirectly derived her right 
of residence from her daughter’s exercise of her right in Article 21 TFEU.105 As will be seen 
below in section 7.2 the Zhu and Chen and Zambrano-cases have many similarities. 
 
6.3 An ever more generous scope of the family rights in Directive 2004/38 
Metock, 2008 
In Metock, the Court gave its, by far, most generous interpretation of the family rights that 
may be derived from secondary legislation.106 The case concerned the TCN spouses of four 
EU citizens who were exercising their right to free movement of workers in Ireland. The TCN 
spouses had made their first entrance in the EU when arriving in Ireland where their initial 
asylum applications had been rejected. The marriages to the EU citizens had taken place after 
arriving in the country. The Irish law transposing the newly adopted Directive 2004/38 
required that, to be eligible for a right of residence in Ireland, a TCN spouse of a migrant EU 
citizen must first have acquired lawful residence in another Member State. The Court 
however, found that the Directive did not allow for a requirement of prior lawful residence. It 
held that it was within the EU competence to disqualify such national legislation where 
“(…) the fact that it is impossible for the Union citizen to be accompanied or joined by his family in the host 
Member State would be such as to interfere with his freedom of movement by discouraging him from 
exercising his rights of entry into or residence in that Member State.”107 
As in Singh and Eind the Court applied the deterrence-principle. The four EU citizens had 
evidently moved to Ireland to work before marrying their TCN spouses. Hence, their initial 
exercise of freedom of movement could not depend on their right to family reunification with 
their spouses.108 The Court however, reasoned that to deny their TCN spouses residence rights, 
might deter EU citizens from remaining in the host Member State since it encouraged them to 
leave in order to pursue their family lives elsewhere. It was therefore unimportant whether the 
migrant EU citizen had formed his family before moving to a host Member State or whether 
                                                
105 Id. at para 13, 28 and 44-46. See also comments by Hofstotter, 2005 op.cit. at pages 553-557. 
106 At the time, several Articles in Regulation No. 1612/68, op.cit. as well as three other residence directives had 
been repealed and replaced by Directive 2004/38, op.cit.  
107 Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 63. See also para 58-70. This was an overruling of the Court’s previous case law 
in Akrich, 2003, op.cit. at para 49-54 where the Court had accepted that the Member States were competent to 
decide whether they wished to require TCN spouses to have obtained prior lawful residence in another Member 
State. 
108 Compare to the Court’s reasoning in Morson and Jhanjan, Singh and Eind discussed supra in sections 5.1 
and 5.2. 
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the marriage took place after migrating.109 This was a clear narrowing of the margin of 
appreciation that the Strasbourg-jurisprudence grants contracting States.110 
The intervening Member States raised the objection that such a broad interpretation of 
Directive 2004/38 would result in “unjustified reverse discrimination” 111 of those EU citizens 
who fell outside its scope. True to its ruling in Jacquet, the Court denied responsibility for any 
effect of reverse discrimination, by pointing out that the situation of EU citizens who fell 
outside the scope of freedom of movement,  
“(…) any difference in treatment between those Union citizens and those who have exercised their right of 
freedom of movement, as regards the entry and residence of their family members, does not therefore fall 
within the scope of Community law.”112 
In Metock, the Court wanted to ensure the effectiveness of also the EU citizenship right to 
free movement and applied the restrictions-approach without distinguishing between the 
economic and non-economic freedoms. It referred to the stated aim in Directive 2004/38 to 
“strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens”113 as well as 
“(…) the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States in order 
to eliminate the obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by the EC Treaty” 
(…) 
“(…) if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise 
of the freedoms they are guaranteed by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed.”114 
Since the Irish measure might discourage foreign EU citizens from moving to and 
remaining in Ireland, it hindered the internal market-goal of the economic freedoms as well as 
restricted the exercise of the EU citizenship right to move and reside freely.115 The ruling 
clearly confirmed that the fundamental right to respect for family life was protected for all EU 
citizens who came within the scope of Directive, 2004/38.  
  
                                                
109 Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 83-93. Costello, 2009, op.cit. at page 601 holds that the ruling thus as makes 
Directive 2004/38, op.cit. an instrument not only for family reunification but also family formation with a TCN 
spouse. 
110 According to the Strasbourg-Court, Article 8 ECHR would not be infringed if a State measure encouraged or 
obliged a EU citizen to move to another State in order to enjoy family reunification. See supra section 6.1.1 on 
Carpenter. See also Costello, 2009, op.cit. at pages 603-604. 
111 Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 76. 
112 Id. at para 78. See supra section 3.2.2 on the ruling in Jacquet. 
113 Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 59 and citing Directive 2004/38, op.cit. 3 recital in the Preamble. Emphasis 
added.  
114 Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 56 and 62. The Court applied a similar restrictions-approach to national 
measures that discourage the exercise of economic freedom of movement in Eind, 2007, op.cit. at para 44 and 
Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 38. 
115 Costello, 2009, op.cit. at page 604 points out that if “an equally broad notion is applied to home State 
measures, the potential scope of the citizenship provisions becomes limitless”. 
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6.4 Aggravating the problem of reverse discrimination 
EU citizenship as the status of all Member State nationals has abolished the requirement of 
economic activity to come within the scope of the generous family life protection in EU law. 
The Court’s elastic and thereby legally uncertain concept of the cross-border element has thus 
become the sole parameter for distinguishing purely internal situations. As shown in the 
chapter below, the rulings in Zambrano and McCarthy affirm that the more generously the 
Court interprets the cross-border element and protects the family life and fundamental rights 
protection of those who come within the scope of freedom of movement; the more unjustified 
becomes the reverse discrimination of those EU citizens who find themselves in purely 
internal situations.116 
 
 
7 Zambrano and McCarthy 
7.1 Two cases concerning EU citizenship and family reunification 
The rulings in Zambrano and McCarthy both confirmed the Court’s use of the 
restrictions-approach to also non-economic freedom of movement and its aim to ensure the 
rights of those EU citizens who come within the scope of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. The 
outcome in Zambrano, however, where the cross-border element was as hypothetical as in 
Rottmann and Garcia Avello, is in contrast to the subsequent McCarthy-ruling. In the latter 
case, the Court confirmed that there is indeed a limit to the scope of EU law protection of 
family life. Reverse discrimination thereby continues to occur in the area of EU citizenship, 
family reunification and fundamental rights protection. 
 
7.2 Zambrano, 2011  
The Colombian nationals Mr and Mrs Ruiz Zambrano arrived in Belgium in 1999 and 
applied for asylum. Belgian authorities refused their request but held that the family should 
not be sent back to Colombia in view of the critical situation there. Mr Ruiz Zambrano 
applied three times for a permanent residence permit from the Belgian Alien’s Office but was 
rejected. The Zambrano family registered in a Belgian municipality and Mr Ruiz Zambrano 
obtained full-time employment with a local company. The children Diego and Jessica were 
                                                
116 See Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 648-652 where she criticises the Court’s 
liberal approach to EU citizenship and family rights since it erodes the legal justification ground for reverse 
discrimination of EU citizens in purely internal situations. For other critics to the occurrence of reverse 
discrimination see supra at footnote 59. 
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born in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Since they were unable to obtain Colombian nationality, 
Belgian law obliged that both children acquired Belgian nationality.117 As a consequence, 
Diego and Jessica became EU citizens. 
In 2005, Belgian labour authorities found out that Mr Ruiz Zambrano had been working 
for almost five years without a work permit and ordered the immediate termination of his 
employment contract. He applied for unemployment benefits but was refused. In his appeal, 
Mr Ruiz Zambrano argued that the Belgian constitutional principle of equality combined with 
the Court’s ruling in Zhu and Chen protected him and his children from reverse 
discrimination. He should consequently be entitled him to derive a right of permanent 
residence and a work permit from the EU citizen status of his children.118 The only difference 
between the cases was that, unlike Catherine Zhu, Diego and Jessica Zambrano were residing 
in their Member State of nationality.119 The Labour Court in Brussels subsequently referred to 
the Court for a preliminary ruling concerning the meaning of Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU 
and the fundamental rights in the Charter. The children, Diego and Jessica, had never left their 
Member State of nationality. By lack of the necessary cross-border element, the Belgian 
Government and all intervening Member States held that the issue was a purely internal 
situation.120 A core question was therefore whether the children’s status as EU citizens was 
sufficient to bring the matter within the scope of EU law.121 
 
7.2.1 The Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 
Sharpston thoroughly analysed the scope and quality of EU citizenship. She began by 
assessing that there was a potential violation of the fundamental rights that are protected 
under EU law: considering how the Court generously interpreted Article 8 ECHR in 
Carpenter, the expulsion order against Mr Ruiz Zambrano would infringe his children’s 
fundamental right to respect for family life.122 
Furthermore, Sharpston held that even if the Court were to find that the situation was 
purely internal, the referred questions were admissible and important to answer. The Belgian 
constitutional principle of equality had recently been applied in a Belgian court to ban the 
occurrence of reverse discrimination in a similar case. The national court therefore needed an 
                                                
117 Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 14-22. 
118 Id. at para 25 – 34 and 38 and Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 39-
43. 
119 Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 95-97, 103-104, 117 and 137. 
120 Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 1-2 and 35-37. 
121 Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 91. 
122 Id. at para 54- 66. Compare to the Court’s reasoning on Mr Carpenter’s fundamental right to family life in 
Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 41-45 and see supra section 6.1.1. 
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interpretation of EU law in order to determine whether there was reverse discrimination of the 
Zambrano family as well.123 Sharpston’s conclusion was, however, that the issue was not a 
purely internal situation. She presented three alternative possibilities for how Mr Ruiz 
Zambrano could be granted a residence and work permit by virtue of EU law. 
 
1) A free-standing EU citizenship right of residence 
As in her opinion in the Flemish Welfare Aid-case, Sharpston proposed to interpret Articles 
20 (2) and 21 TFEU as containing two free-standing EU citizenship rights: a right to free 
movement and a right of residence, reliable also against the Member State of nationality. As a 
result, EU citizens, who had never moved across inter-state borders, could also contest 
national measures that interfered with their fundamental right to respect for family life in 
Article 8 ECHR. If the Court were to follow this line of reasoning it would have truly 
remarkable consequences and reverse discrimination would no longer be an issue in EU 
law.124 
Sharpston held that, similar to Catherine Zhu, the Zambrano children could not exercise 
the proposed free-standing right of residence without the support of their parents. Mr Ruiz 
Zambrano should therefore be granted residence and work permits as the primary carer and 
provider of resources for his children who were exercising their EU citizenship right of 
residence. 125 
In addition, she pointed out that to deny Mr Ruiz Zambrano residence rights in Belgium 
would presumably have the consequence of Diego and Jessica having to leave the EU. They 
would then be unable to exercise their right of residence as well as any future, hypothetical 
exercise of freedom of movement.126 As shall be seen below, this was the line of reasoning 
that the Court later followed in its ruling. 
 
2) Reverse discrimination 
Sharpston proposed an alternative possibility to motivate why Mr Ruiz Zambrano should 
be entitled to derive a right of residence from EU law. Article 18 TFEU, which expresses the 
principle of equality, could be applied to prohibit reverse discrimination on EU level.127 
                                                
123 Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 36-44. In inter alia cases Dzozdi, 1990, op.cit, Guimont, 2000, 
op.cit. and, Reisch, 2002, op.cit. the Court answered questions referred by the national courts although the cases 
were purely internal situations See supra, section 4.2. 
124 Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at inter alia para 69-81, 84 and 122. See also supra section 4.3 and 
footnotes 60-61. 
125 Id. at para 117. 
126 Id. at para 98-102. 
127 Id. at para 123-150 and notably para 144. Compare to the Advocate’s General Opinion in Saunders, 1979, 
op.cit. at 1142-1143. 
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Sharpston criticised the Court’s acceptance of reverse discrimination in the area of EU 
citizenship rights. She pointed to the paradoxical situation of a EU where only EU citizens 
whose situations qualify for the scope of EU law, may rely on the EU code of fundamental 
rights while EU citizens whose situations are found to be purely internal, may not refer to the 
same fundamental rights protection. The exclusion of some EU citizens from that protection 
becomes increasingly unjustified given the arbitrariness of the loosened and legally uncertain 
cross-border element requirement.128 
 
3) Fundamental rights as EU constitutional rights 
Thirdly, Sharpston held that EU law was bound to take an evolutionary leap towards a 
constitutionalized, free-standing fundamental rights protection in any area where the Member 
States have conferred powers to the EU. EU law would thereby develop into recognising the 
fundamental right to respect for family life as a directly effective constitutional right for all 
EU citizens and not only applicable to situations that prove a link to some other EU 
provision.129  
“In the long run, only seamless protection of fundamental rights under EU law in all areas of exclusive or 
shared competence matches the concept of EU citizenship.”130 
However, Sharpston concluded that the proposed approach would be a significant step 
towards a federalized EU structure. This would require extensive political processes, 
legislation and further evolutions in case law. She therefore discarded her own proposal as 
premature and inapplicable to the present situation of Mr Ruiz Zambrano.131 In the last point 
she however expressed that such a constitutional evolution was anticipated and necessary.132 
 
7.2.2 The Judgement of the Court 
The ruling was remarkably short but the Court clearly confirmed that it has adopted a 
restrictions-approach to the exercise of non-economic free movement and aims to protect the 
rights attached to the status of EU citizenship. The ruling seemed to once and for all abolish 
the requirement of a cross-border element for the enjoyment of EU citizenship rights but, as 
shall be seen below, it did in fact not put an end to the rule of purely internal situations. 
Firstly, the Court rejected that the Zambrano-case came within the scope of the family 
member rights in Directive 2004/38. As in Carpenter, the secondary legislation could only 
                                                
128 Id. at para 83-88, 125-138 and 141.  
129 Id. at para 151-170. See also the Opinion of the Advocate’s General in Konstantinidis, 1993, op.cit. at 1211-
1213 where he proposed that EU citizens should enjoy the same fundamental rights-protection wherever they go 
in the Union. 
130 Id. at para 170. 
131 Id. at 171-176. 
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govern the situation of EU citizens who had effectively resided in another Member State than 
that of nationality.133 Instead, the Court examined the scope of the EU citizenship rights in 
Article 20 TFEU. By referring to its reasoning in the Rottmann-case, the Court stated that: 
“Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the 
Union.” 134 
The Court then applied this jurisprudence to the factual circumstances. Similar to Advocate 
General Sharpston, the Court held that presumably, Diego and Jessica would be forced to 
leave the EU if their parents were deported. The same consequence could be assumed if their 
father was not granted a work permit. He would then not be able to provide sufficient 
resources for him and his family. Consequently, the refusal to grant Mr Ruiz Zambrano a 
residence and work permit had the effect of depriving his EU citizen minor children, who 
were dependent upon him, the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their EU citizenship 
rights.135 
The Court was, however, silent on the point of whether, as Sharpston proposed, there is a 
free-standing right of residence expressed in Articles 20 (2) and 21 TFEU, the enjoyment of 
which Diego and Jessica risked loosing if they were forced to leave the EU. As in Garcia 
Avello and Rottmann, the Court might rather have been protecting the future, hypothetical 
exercise by Diego and Jessica of the EU citizenship right to move and reside freely within the 
EU. Exercise of that right would have been impossible if they were no longer in the EU. 
Similar to Catherine Zhu, Diego and Jessica would have to fulfil the condition of sufficient 
resources to legally exercise their EU citizenship right of residence in any other Member State. 
This would be difficult if their father did not enjoy legal residence and work permit in 
Belgium to begin with.136  
It is noteworthy that the Court did not address the question of reverse discrimination, since 
the referring Belgian court was concerned with that issue. Instead the Court used Zambrano 
as a basis to further widen the scope of Article 20 TFEU and thereby affirm the legal quality 
of EU citizenship.  
                                                                                                                                                   
132 Id. at 177. 
133 Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 39. See also Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 34-36 and Article 3 in Directive 
2004/38, op.cit. 
134 Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 42. See also para 40-41 and Rottmann, 2010, op.cit. at para 42. 
135 Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. at para 43-45. 
136 Article 21 TFEU and Article 7 in Directive 2004/38 op.cit. allow the Member States to condition the right of 
residence in a host Member State with economic self-sufficiency. In Zhu and Chen, 2004, op.cit. at para 26-28 
Catherine Zhu was held to fulfil said condition since her TCN mother provided the necessary resources for her. 
See supra section 6.2.2. 
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As Wiesbrock has pointed out, the ruling has the peculiar result that, for the purpose of 
obtaining family reunification, it is now more advantageous to come within the scope of 
Articles 20-21 TFEU than of Directive 2004/38. EU citizens who effectively move to another 
Member State must fulfil the Directive’s conditions of self-sufficiency. If, however, as for the 
Zambrano family, the Directive does not apply, the residence rights indirectly derived from 
primary law are granted unconditionally.137 What the Court pointed out in Eind must apply 
also to the Zambrano children; their residence in their home State of Belgium must be 
unconditional. Therefore, their family member’s derived residence rights could not depend on 
the children fulfilling the Directive’s requirement of sufficient economic resources either. 138 
The result of the rulings in Zambrano and Rottmann is a further narrowing of the purely 
internal situations-rule in the area of free movement of persons and EU citizenship rights. 
Clearly, the right of non-economic freedom of movement and the associated EU citizenship 
rights do not require a factual cross-border element to be applicable. This jurisprudence was 
applied to the subsequent ruling in McCarthy. By referring to Zambrano and looking at 
whether the national measure at hand was hindering Mrs McCarthy from enjoying her EU 
citizenship rights, the Court determined whether her case came within the scope of EU law. 
 
7.3 McCarthy, 2011 
Mrs McCarthy was a British national, living and residing in the UK since birth. By virtue 
of her mother being an Irish national, she automatically obtained Irish nationality when she 
was born. As a holder of dual nationality, Mrs McCarthy attempted to bring her situation 
within the scope of EU law. The intention was that her husband, of Jamaican nationality, 
would be able to derive a right of residence in the UK from her status as a EU citizen.139 
Mr and Mrs McCarthy had married in 2002 but Mr McCarthy lacked permission to stay in 
the UK. According to British immigration law, being the spouse of a UK national was not 
enough to obtain a residence permit. A TCN person had to qualify for residence in the country 
                                                
137 See the EU-Observer online article by Wiesbrock, 2011, op.cit. 
138 Id. and Eind, 2007, op.cit. at para 31, In Carpenter, 2002, op.cit. at para 42-44 the Court pointed out that 
since Mrs Carpenter’s residence rights were derived from Article 8 ECHR, her residence in the UK could only 
be conditioned by the legal limitations to fundamental rights in the ECHR: she must not constitute a threat to 
public order and public safety. 
139 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 22-23 and the Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion at para 2, 8 and 20-23. Mrs 
McCarthy surely posed this claim in the light of the Court’s Judgement in Garcia Avello, 2003, op.cit. where 
dual nationality had been a sufficient cross-border element to bring the matter within the scope of EU law. For a 
thorough critic of the arbitrariness of accepting artificial cross-border elements as connecting factor with EU law 
see Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …” 2009, op.cit. at pages 634-653.  
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on independent grounds.140 Consequently, it would be a clear advantage to be the TCN spouse 
of a EU citizen who came within the scope of the Treaty’s freedom of movement provisions. 
The stricter UK immigration rules would not be imposed on the family members of a EU 
citizen who came within the scope and fulfilled the requirements for lawful residence of 
Directive 2004/38.141 
Following her marriage, Mrs McCarthy made sure to obtain an Irish passport. She then 
applied for a right of residence in the UK on the basis of being a national of another EU 
Member State. Her husband simultaneously applied for a derived right of residence as the 
spouse of a migrant EU citizen. British authorities refused both applications on the grounds 
that Mrs McCarthy did not come within the scope of the British legislation transposing 
Directive 2004/38.142 The fact was that Mrs McCarthy was unemployed and living off of state 
benefits. Even if her dual nationality would have been enough to come within the scope of the 
Directive she did not fulfil the requirements of self-sufficiency.143 Mrs McCarthy immediately 
appealed against the decision and was to spend several years of bringing appeals and 
receiving rejections from various British courts. The most recent appeal came to the British 
Supreme Court, which decided to refer two questions for preliminary ruling to the Court: 
Firstly, could a person of dual Irish and British nationality who had always resided in the UK 
come within scope of the Directive 2004/38? Secondly, could such a person be assessed to 
have resided lawfully in the host Member States in circumstances where she was unable to 
satisfy the Directive’s requirements of being a worker, self-employed or otherwise 
economically self-sufficient person? 144 Although Mrs McCarthy held that her dual nationality 
was sufficient to bring her situation within the scope of EU law, all intervening Member 
States as well as the Commission were of the opposite view.145 
 
7.3.1 The opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
Advocate General Kokott’s answer to the referred questions was decisively no. She 
concluded that Mrs McCarthy’s case did not come within the scope of EU law. Her husband’s 
possibility to obtain a residence permit was a purely internal situation to which only national 
                                                
140 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 13-15. 
141 Articles 3, 7-9 and 16 in Directive 2004/ 38 op.cit. 
142 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 16-17. The UK law transposing Directive 2004/38, op.cit. defined the 
beneficiaries of the provisions very similar to the definition of beneficiaries in the Directive’s Article 3. 
143 Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 9, 25 and 43-44. See also Articles 3 and 7 in Directive 2004/38, 
op.cit.  
144 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at 18-21. 
145 Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 19 and 23. 
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immigration law applied. 146 Kokott found that since Mrs McCarthy had never made use of her 
right to free movement, the right to family reunification in secondary legislation was not 
applicable.147 Nor did she come within the scope of the EU citizenship rights in Articles 18, 20 
and 21 TFEU. The fact that she held dual nationality was not causing her inconvenience or 
discrimination similar to the Garcia Avello children.148  
 “Union citizens such as Mrs McCarthy neither suffer prejudice to their right of free movement nor are 
discriminated against compared with other British nationals who are in a comparable situation. The mere fact 
that she has not only British but also Irish nationality does not make it necessary to apply to her and her 
family members the EU law provisions on the right of entry and of residence.”149 
Furthermore, Kokott held that Article 21 TFEU could not be read as containing a free-
standing EU citizenship right of residence, reliable also against the Member State of 
nationality. Effective cross-border migration to a Member State other than that of nationality 
was a precondition for relying on the right of residence.150 
Kokott admitted that reverse discrimination might arise as the result of applying the more 
generous EU rules to EU citizens who come within the scope of freedom of movement but not 
to those who lack a sufficient connection.151 By referring to the Court’s statement in Metock, 
her conclusion was however that “EU law provides no means of dealing with this problem.”152 
She acknowledged that the Court’s view of EU citizenship as the fundamental status of the 
Member State nationals might, in time, lead to a revision of its current approach to reverse 
discrimination. But she underlined that the McCarthy-case was not the appropriate basis for 
such a new turn. As a dependant on social allowances, Mrs McCarthy could not have fulfilled 
the Directive’s requirements of self-sufficiency in order to legally reside in a host Member 
State. Therefore, not even if reverse discrimination was prohibited would Mrs McCarthy and 
                                                
146 Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 25, 30-31, 38, 45 and 57. It is significant to note that Kokott’s 
Opinion in McCarthy came out on 25 November 2010. This was after Sharpston had published her Opinion in 
Zambrano on 30 September 2010 but before the Court’s ruling in Zambrano on 8 March 2011. 
147 Id. at para 30. Compare this to the cases Singh, 1992, op.cit. and Eind, 2007, op.cit. which both concerned 
Member State nationals who had effectively migrated to a host Member State and then returned to their home 
State. Article 3 (1) in Directive 2004/38, op.cit. states that “This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who 
move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national” 
148 Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 34. 
149 Id. at para 38. 
150 Id. at para 31 and footnote 26 where Kokott states that she is aware that Advocate General Sharpston takes 
the opposite view in her Opinion in Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. 
151 Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 39. 
152 Id. at para 40. As the Court made clear in Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 77-80 such difference in treatment of a 
Member State’s own nationals who have not exercised the right to free movement is the responsibility of the 
Member State. 
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her husband be in a comparable situation to those migrant EU citizens who may rely on the 
conditioned residence right in Article 21 TFEU.153 
Kokott concluded her opinion by recognizing that the refusal to grant Mr McCarthy a right 
of residence might be an interference with the fundamental right to respect for family life in 
Article 8 ECHR. However, since the case was a purely internal situation, any infringement of 
the McCarthy couple’s rights under the ECHR was strictly within the jurisdiction of the 
national court to address.154 
 
7.3.2 The Judgement of the Court 
The Court chose to divide its assessment in two parts. The core question was whether the 
situation of Mrs McCarthy could come within the scope of firstly, Directive 2004/38, or 
secondly, the EU citizenship right to move and reside freely, which is specified in Article 21 
TFEU.155 
 
1) The applicability of Directive 2004/38 
As in the Carpenter-case, the Court underlined that the right to family reunification laid down 
in secondary legislation was only applicable when a EU citizen effectively resided in a 
Member State other than that of nationality. Article 22 in Directive 2004/38, which provides 
that EU citizens may rely on the right to move and reside freely within the whole territory of 
the Member States, should be understood as only referring to “the whole territory of the host 
Member State”, which presupposed movement from the home State.156 The right of residence 
stated in Directive 2004/38 could consequently not be regarded as a free-standing right. 
Residence was to be seen as a merely ancillary right to freedom of movement and a means to 
facilitate cross-border migration. The fact that Mrs McCarthy held dual nationality could not 
mean that she was exercising her right to free movement.157 
Furthermore, since the right of residence in a person’s State of nationality is unconditional, a 
Member State national could never be subject to the requirements for lawful residence laid 
                                                
153 Id. at para 43-44. See also references supra footnote 138. 
154 Id. at para 59-60. See also Metock, 2008, op.cit. at para 79 where the Court reminded the Member States that 
in purely internal situations, EU citizens were protected under Article 8 ECHR through national law. 
155 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 26. 
156 Id. at para 30-33 and 37-39. Compare this to the view taken by the Advocate General in Saunders, 1979, 
op.cit. at 1143 that the Treaty’s freedom of movement for workers should cover every part of the Member States’ 
territories, including a person’s home State. 
157 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit. at para 35-37 and 40-41. 
 40 
down in that Directive.158 Consequently, the Directive’s residence rights were not applicable 
against a person’s home Member State. 
Lastly, since TCN family members could only derive their right of residence from the 
status of a EU citizen who came within the Directive’s scope, Mr McCarthy could not rely on 
said provisions either.159 
 
2) The applicability of Article 21 TFEU 
For the second assessment, the Court began by echoing its case law regarding purely 
internal situations: 
“(…) the Treaty rules governing freedom of movement for persons and the measures adopted to implement 
them cannot be applied to situations which have no factor linking them with any of the situations governed 
by European Union law and which are confined in all relevant respects within a single Member State” 160 
It was clear that Mrs McCarthy had never resided outside the UK or exercised an economic 
freedom. This fact was, however, not enough to immediately discard the case as a purely 
internal situation.161 The Court confirmed that Mrs McCarthy, by virtue of being a EU citizen, 
was entitled to rely on her right to free movement in Article 21 TFEU against her Member 
State of nationality.162 However, by referring to its latest jurisprudence, the Court firmly 
rejected that Mrs McCarthy’s situation came within the scope of that provision. The fact that 
British authorities did not take Mrs McCarthy’s dual nationality into account when denying 
her a EU based right of residence in the UK, had in no way affected her enjoyment of the 
substance of her EU citizenship rights or restricted her exercise of her right to free 
movement.163 
The Court did not mention the obvious intention of Mrs McCarthy to obtain a EU based 
residence permit for herself so that her husband could derive a residence right from her status. 
Neither was there any reference to the right to respect for family life in Article 8 ECHR, or 
                                                
158 Id. at 29 and 34. See Singh, 1992, op.cit. at para 22 and Eind, 2007, op.cit. at 31-32 where the Court referred 
to a person’s unconditional right under international law, to enter and reside in the territory of his State of 
nationality. 
159 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit at para 42-43. 
160 Id. at para 45. Compare to the Court’s similar statements in Saunders, 1979, op.cit. at para 11, Metock, 2008, 
op.cit. at para 77 and Flemish Welfare Aid, 2008, op.cit. at para 33. 
161 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit at para 46-47. The Court was certainly considering the recent ruling in Zambrano and 
its elastic concept of the cross-border element, in inter alia Schempp, 2005, op.cit. which necessitated a careful 
assessment of Mrs McCarthy’s circumstances.  
162 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit at para 48. 
163 McCarthy, 2011, op.cit at para 49-56. See notably para 53 where the Court pointed out that the national 
measures in Garcia Avello, 2003, op.cit. and Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. would have had the consequence of 
depriving the claimants of effective enjoyment of their EU citizenship rights and constituted an obstacle to the 
exercise of the right to free movement and residence in Article 21 TFEU. See also supra section 6.2.2 on Zhu 
and Chen, 2004, op.cit. and section 3.2 on Rottmann, 2010, op.cit. 
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Articles 7 and 33 the Charter.164 By its silence on this point, the Court confirmed the limited 
scope of the Charter. 165 Fundamental rights cannot be ensured under EU law in purely internal 
situations and they do not have the character of being constitutional EU citizenship rights.166 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
8.1 The generous but legally uncertain scope of EU law 
As the Court has looked beyond the Union’s internal market-goal, the rule of purely 
internal situations has been narrowed down to the benefit of a widened scope of the freedom 
of movement for persons provisions. This has resulted in and an increasingly generous 
protection of the right to family reunification. The Court has adopted a restrictions-approach 
to facilitate the exercise of also non-economic free movement and has taken the aim to ensure 
the enjoyment of EU citizenship and fundamental rights of those EU citizens who come 
within the scope of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU. But as the traditional requirements of economic 
activity and physical cross-border movement have been lifted, it has become more and more 
uncertain what conditions a EU citizen must fulfil to enjoy family life protection under EU 
law. 
 
8.2 Abolishing restrictions and ensuring fundamental rights 
The cases Singh, Eind, and Metock showed that to have exercised economic freedom of 
movement is enough to rely on the right to family reunification with TCN family members 
under secondary legislation. In Metock the Court made no difference between the exercise of 
the economic freedoms and the EU citizenship right of freedom of movement but upheld the 
fundamental right to family life of also non-economically active EU citizens.  
In Grzelczyk and Baumbast and R, the Court further strengthened the status of EU 
citizenship by establishing that equal treatment and the right to move and reside freely are 
                                                
164 In her Opinion in McCarthy, 2011, op.cit at para 59-60 Kokott pointed out that the McCarthy’s were covered 
by the protection of Article 8 ECHR by virtue of the UK being a contracting party to the ECHR. See supra 
section 7.3.1. 
165 Article 51 the Charter and Article 6 TEU limit the Charter’s scope of application to the actions of the EU 
institutions and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law and explicitly prohibit that 
the Charter provisions should extend the competences that the Member States have conferred to the Union. 
Tryfonidou, ”Family Reunification …”, 2009, op.cit. at page 652 points out that the Court must clarify the 
meaning of Article 51 the Charter.  
166 Id. See de Búrca, 2011, op.cit. at pages 484-485 and compare to the statements in the Advocate General 
Opinions in Konstantinidis, 1993, op.cit. and Zambrano, 2011, op.cit. referred to supra at footnotes 129-132 that 
EU citizens should be ensured a uniform fundamental rights protection wherever they are within the Union. 
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directly effective EU citizenship rights. In addition, fundamental rights have gained 
importance in EU law and are ensured for any EU citizen who comes within the scope of 
freedom of movement. This scope has widened as a result of the Court’s restrictions-approach 
and generous interpretation of the cross-border element to include the protection of also future, 
hypothetical exercise of the right to free movement. When the relevant secondary legislation 
has not been directly applicable for obtaining family reunification, the Court has entitled TCN 
family members to indirectly derive residence rights from EU law by the use of Article 8 
ECHR and parents as providers and carers of children who come within the scope of EU law. 
 
8.3 Zambrano and McCarthy – contrasting rulings 
At first glance, the Zambrano-ruling seemed to put an end to the rule of purely internal 
situations. In line with the Rottmann-case, it showed that Articles 20 and 21 TFEU are 
applicable without any physical cross-border movement or residence in a host Member State 
if the future, hypothetical enjoyment of EU citizenship rights is at stake. With regards to the 
right to family reunification, Zambrano confirmed that the Court is especially concerned with 
the rights of minors. As the Court had also made clear in Baumbast and R and Zhu and Chen, 
the children’s factual or potential exercise of their rights under EU law necessitated the 
residence rights of their TCN parents. 
The McCarthy-ruling, on the other hand, confirmed two things. Firstly, although the 
requirement of physical cross-border movement has been lifted, there are still purely internal 
situations where EU law is inapplicable. Secondly, the Court is less generous to extend the 
scope of EU law when it comes to adult EU citizens who wish to enjoy family life in their 
home Member States. The argument that the Court should remedy reverse discrimination as it 
results in unjustified difference in treatment between EU citizens was not convincing in the 
case of Mrs McCarthy since she was not in a comparable situation to a migrant EU citizen 
like Mrs Singh or Mr Eind. In contrast to the non-migrant Mr Carpenter, she did not pursue 
any of the economic freedoms. Nor was she economically self-sufficient, as Catherine Zhu 
was – thanks to the resources provided by her mother. An expulsion order against her husband 
would not have had the effect of forcing her to leave the Union, which had been the risk in the 
Zambrano-case. Consequently, she could not have fulfilled the conditions for a right of 
residence in secondary legislation in a host Member State. As the Court did not find that Mrs 
McCarthy’s factual or hypothetical exercise of her EU citizenship right to free movement in 
Article 21 TFEU was at risk, there was no reason to protect her fundamental right to family 
life under EU law either. 
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8.4 No EU remedy for reverse discrimination 
The combination of the Court’s restrictions-approach to non-economic freedom of 
movement and its rights-aimed jurisprudence has filled the status of EU citizenship with 
strong legal quality. Nevertheless, the more generous the Court protects the rights of the 
individuals who come within the scope of the economic freedoms or the EU citizenship right 
to free movement, the more problematic becomes the occurrence of reverse discrimination of 
those who find themselves in purely internal situations. 
The Zambrano-ruling established that also non-migrant and non-economically active EU 
citizens might come within the scope of EU citizenship rights. The delimiting factor is 
whether there is a potential restriction to their exercise of the right to free movement and the 
enjoyment of the subsequent EU citizenship rights. By contrast, Mrs McCarthy’s potential 
enjoyment of her EU citizenship rights was not at risk if she could not obtain the residence 
permit in the UK that she had applied for. Hence, without being able to point to an obstacle to 
the exercise of freedom of movement, her case was a purely internal situation. Her 
fundamental right to respect for family life could therefore only be ensured through British 
law and by reliance on the Strasbourg-jurisprudence, which does not oppose to refusing her 
husband a residence permit in the country where she is a national. By lack of comparability 
with those EU citizens who fulfil the conditions for lawful residence, the McCarthy-case was 
not ideal for tackling the issue of reverse discrimination. It is, however, not certain that the 
Court would have delivered a different ruling if Mrs McCarthy would have been a worker or 
economically self-sufficient. Since the Court refrained from remedying reverse discrimination 
in cases like Metock and Flemish Welfare Aid, it cannot be assumed that it would have done it 
in the McCarthy-case either, even if the facts had been different. 
The problem of reverse discrimination is aggravated by the Court’s elastic definition of 
the cross-border element and the wide, legally uncertain concept of restrictions. How are 
national authorities and courts to establish which measures that might restrict the potential 
exercise of free movement and enjoyment of EU citizenship rights? How can it be justified 
that the EU protection of the fundamental right to family life in Article 8 ECHR is more 
generous than the Strasbourg-jurisprudence requires the Member States to be? In this author’s 
view, the most important issue is to define a justifiable and legally certain ground for why 
some EU citizens fall outside the scope of EU family life protection while others may rely, 
directly or indirectly, on EU law to obtain family reunification with TCN family members. 
Currently, because of the absence of a clear delimitation ground, the surest way for a EU 
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citizen to enjoy the right to family reunification with a TCN family member is to effectively 
move to a host Member State and there prove to fulfil the conditions for lawful residence. 
 
8.5 A question of the future direction of the EU 
The issues of how to limit the scope of EU law and how to address the subsequent reverse 
discrimination are not yet solved. In the delicate area of family reunification and for the 
purpose of a uniform fundamental rights protection, as sought by the Advocates General 
Jacobs and Sharpston in Konstantinidis and Zambrano respectively, it is much needed that the 
Court or the EU legislator find a solution. The solution must, however, be politically and 
socially well anchored. The issue of purely internal situations does not just concern which 
quality and meaning the status of EU citizenship shall have, it is also part of the greater issue 
of what future direction the EU is to take. As acknowledged by Sharpston, it is not unlikely 
that the EU will take a leap towards a federalized structure, where mere Member State 
nationality would be sufficient to enjoy a set of constitutional rights. The Court would then no 
longer need to motivate a complicated restrictions-rationale or search for obstacles to the 
enjoyment of EU citizenship rights to include certain EU citizens within its protective scope. 
But there are vast implications to completely abolishing purely internal situations in the area 
of EU citizenship and fundamental rights. The wordings that the Member States have chosen 
in Article 51 the Charter and Article 6 TEU prove that they are not yet ready for such a 
development. Out of respect for its limited competences, the Court should rightfully hesitate 
to extend the scope of EU citizenship and fundamental rights to purely internal situations. 
However, the Court’s increasingly blurred distinction between those EU citizens who do and 
those who don’t come within the scope of Article 21 TFEU seems more and more unjustified 
and creates a high level of legal uncertainty. Is the Court trying to speed up a process of 
constitutional and social integration? Or is it simply interpreting the EU Treaties in a way that 
the Member States have in fact laid the ground for, although the political processes have not 
proven to live up to it in time? More importantly, is there a social legitimisation ground for 
giving EU citizenship a constitutional character, which would make it a more important status 
than the peoples’ national citizenships? Considering the rise of nationalist parties in several 
Member States, which oppose the idea of multiculturalism, seek to limit free movement of 
persons and object to common EU immigration laws, it seems distant to assume that there is 
enough social acceptance for a step towards a more federalized EU. 
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